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in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council 
An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model 
Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska 
Abstract 
his study analyses the allocation of power in the Governing Council of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and 
monetary union. For this purpose, classical power indices that have their origin in 
solutions of cooperative games are applied. First, an assessment is made of the effects of 
enlargement on the voting power of different subgroups of the Governing Council that arise in 
the wake of the continuous accession process. Second, a systematic comparison is carried out of 
the status quo rule (‘one member, one vote’) with respect to the voting power of the ECB 
Executive Board and to the representativeness of European monetary policy, along with the 
potential for its re-nationalisation. 
 
 
Keywords:   Eastern enlargement, euro area, European Central Bank, 
monetary policy, rotation, voting rights 
JEL classification:  D72, E58 
 
 
 
T | 1 
The Allocation of Power 
in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council 
An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model 
Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska 
Introduction 
At the end of quite secretive discussions, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) finally published its proposal for the reform of its decision-making process in early 2003. 
Meeting in Brussels on 21 March 2003, the heads of state of EU member countries approved the 
ECB’s proposal on the rotation model. This unanimous decision came somewhat as a surprise to 
some analysts, in view of the heavy resistance to the proposal as late as the middle of March in 
countries such as Finland and the Netherlands, whose parliaments felt that it placed them at a 
disadvantage. Moreover, political acceptance of the proposal is by no means certain as all of the 
15 national parliaments must still ratify the modification of the EU Treaty.  
It is well known that the ECB’s reform proposal consists of a ‘minimum representation model’, 
which combines elements of rotation as applied by the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors 
and elements of representation, i.e. the formation of country groups with group representatives 
following the examples set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank or the 
Bundesbank Council after German unification (see for example ECB, 2003). In this context, it is 
important to note that enhancing efficiency was not the main motivation for the introduction of 
the rotation principle in the Federal Open Market Committee. Instead, the voting power of 
regional governors was restricted in order to be able to run a common monetary policy for a 
common region instead of a monetary policy driven by regional interests. Most remarkably, the 
delegation of decision-making competences in the ECB to a small committee with only a few 
national representatives (delegation or centralisation) was not regarded as an option at all. It was 
consistently argued by the former President of the ECB, Wim Duisenberg (although questioned 
by European jurisprudence), that the wording of Art. 5 of the Treaty of Nice, along with Art. 
10.2 and Art. 10.6 (the so-called ‘enabling clause’) of the statute of the European System of 
Central Banks prohibited a delegation or centralisation solution and limited the scope of Council 
reform to a mere change in the voting procedures. Supporting this view would imply accepting 
that the blueprint of the Treaty of Nice was flawed and that the present lopsided construction 
was owing to the lack of political power to correct the mistake.  
By speeding up the process of passing the reform, the ECB Governing Council met two 
strategic targets at once. First, its own proposal could be completely discussed before the new 
members participated in the decision. Second, the ECB itself took the initiative to put forward a 
proposal and did not leave it, for instance, to the EU Commission. But how should the ECB’s 
proposal be assessed? 
•  Without a doubt, the coming expansion of the euro area requires reform of the highest 
decision-making body of the European Central Bank, because otherwise the ECB 
Governing Council is going to comprise more than 30 members. The increase in the size of 
the Council will give rise to efficiency problems in the body that is responsible for the 
stability of one of the most important world currencies (i.e. a ‘numbers problem’ – see for 
example Berger, 2002). 
•  Unfortunately, according to a plethora of authors (e.g. Bofinger, 2003, Gros, 2003 and 
Meade, 2003b), the ECB’s proposal seems to be even less preferable than the current 2 | BELKE & STYCZYNSKA 
 
decision-making procedure in the ECB Governing Council, which is by no means optimally 
prepared for eurozone enlargement. The rotation model suggested by the ECB violates the 
fundamental principle of ‘one member, one vote’, which is intended to ensure that ECB 
Governing Council members participate in the Council’s meetings personally and 
independently, and not as national stakeholders. The rotation model cultivates thinking in 
national terms, reduces the responsibility of the rotating members for monetary decisions 
and diminishes transparency. Furthermore, the cap on the total number of rights to vote at 
21 is far too generous by international standards and will lead to more inefficiency in the 
decision-making process. In addition, the rotation model is inconsistent and contains 
arbitrary elements, such as the fact that the frequency of the voting rights’ rotation is not 
explained and that a very small country such as Luxembourg will have a similar number of 
voting rights as Poland.  
In this report, section 1 presents the ECB’s reform proposal for the decision-making process in 
an enlarged eurozone, i.e. the minimum representation model. The remaining parts of this 
contribution offer an empirical assessment of the resulting shifts in power among the euro-area 
member states. For this purpose, section 2 introduces the power index concept and explains how 
to apply it to the new rotation model. Section 3 presents some algorithm-based results and 
compares them to the respective power indices prevailing in the status quo. Moreover, this 
section assesses whether the new rotation model serves the important principle of 
representativeness. Section 4 concludes and discusses further directions for research.  
1. Minimum  Representation:  The ECB’s Reform Proposal 
A (price) stability-oriented European monetary policy represents a collective good for the euro 
countries because a low and stable rate of inflation is the best precondition for investment, 
growth and employment. By contrast, a monetary policy prone to inflation may bring 
unemployment down in the short term but reduces medium- and long-term growth and 
employment. It is the central task of any monetary policy constitution to assure that a central 
bank like the ECB is not tempted to jeopardise a reasonable stabilisation policy because of the 
short-term demands of governments or well-organised lobbyists. In Europe, this constitution 
comprises: 1) the anchoring of the goal of price stability in the EU Treaty; 2) a concept of 
monetary policy that allows a viable policy of price stability as well as the documentation and 
verification of the ECB’s willingness to maintain stability; and 3) the organisation of the 
monetary decision-making. Particularly the latter item is of central importance, because this is 
where the framework for daily decisions is laid down.  
The necessity of reforming the decision-making process in the ECB Governing Council is 
beyond question (Berger, 2002). Under the prevailing body of rules, an expanded euro area 
would lead to a large ECB Governing Council that is hardly capable of acting. Including the six 
members of the Executive Board, the Governing Council would consist of more than 30 
members. Guided by national interests, the latter would as a rule tenaciously struggle to arrive at 
day-to-day decisions. This absolute increase in the number of members of the ECB Council 
would in the end lead to efficiency problems. Another dimension of the problem is that the 
formation of coalitions among smaller euro-area member countries could lead to interest rate 
decisions that are not optimal for the euro area as a whole. The period of natural coalition 
among the governors of the larger member countries and the Executive Board, which in the first 
four and a half years of monetary union enabled consensus decisions, would end.  
Finally, the discrepancy between the economic and the political weight of the euro member 
countries in the Council would even increase because of the fact that the new members tend to 
be (in economic terms) smaller in size. An overly strong representation of the acceding 
countries, which are characterised by higher inflation owing to the Samuelson-Balassa effect, THE ALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE ENLARGED ECB GOVERNING COUNCIL | 3 
 
could lead to additional economic costs for the eurozone. According to some critics, these costs 
would consist of either higher inflation in the euro area (although the latter should not be 
estimated as very high, i.e. above 0.2 percentage points of total euro-area inflation) or higher 
nominal and real interest rates in the eurozone than otherwise (if the ECB reacts to this 
inflationary bias). Of course this argument heavily depends on whether there really are 
differences in motivation between the old member countries of the eurozone and the 
newcomers. Nevertheless, one should not be so confident that the core countries of the 
economic and monetary union (EMU) endanger the stability mandate of the ECB to a lesser 
extent than the new member states will do later on (consider, for example, the erosion of the 
stability and growth pact by Germany). The central question raised in this contribution is 
whether the ECB’s reform proposal is able to handle and solve these future problems. 
Based on the assumption of a future euro area with 27 member countries (the current 12 
members, plus the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark, plus the 10 Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) that joined the EU in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania) the ECB’s 
Governing Council would consist of 27 national central bank (NCB) governors and six 
directors. According to the ECB’s rotation model, voting rights would in the end be divided as 
follows (see Table 1): 
•  The six directors would possess a permanent right to vote. 
•  The five biggest countries (Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Spain) would represent, 
according to the criteria, a five-sixth share of euro GDP at market prices and a one-sixth 
share in the aggregated balance sheet of the eurozone monetary financial institutions 
(MFIs). Together they would be allocated a total of four votes – i.e. these national central 
bank governors would have to suspend their voting right in one-fifth of the meetings. 
•  A total of eight votes would be assigned to the NCB governors of 14 middle-sized member 
countries. Thus, the participants of this group would be entitled to vote in only 57% of all 
decisions. 
•  The remaining eight NCB governors would only be allocated three rights to vote, which 
implies that these representatives would be suspended from 62.5% of the voting dates. 
•  Irrespective of their specific voting rights, all NCB governors would be able to participate in 
the discussions on the monetary policy of the ECB Governing Council. 
•  The problem of countries not joining the euro area at the same time was solved by forming 
two groups until the accession of the 22 members (Table 2). 
Table 1. ECB rotation model – Voting shares and frequencies of voting (three groups) 
    Number of governors in the Governing Council 
    22  23 24 25 26 27 
Voting  shares  4/5  4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 
Group 1 
Frequency of voting (%)  80  80  80  80  80  80 
Voting  shares  8/11  8/12 8/12 8/13 8/13 8/14 
Group 2 
Frequency of voting (%)  73  67  67  62  62  57 
Voting shares   3/6  3/6  3/7  3/7  3/8  3/8 
Group 3 
Frequency of voting (%)  50  50  43  43  38  38 
Sum  15  15 15 15 15 15 
Source: ECB (2003, p. 79). 4 | BELKE & STYCZYNSKA 
 
Table 2. ECB rotation model – Voting shares and frequencies of voting (two groups) 
   Number of governors in the Governing Council 
   16 17 18 19 20 21 
Voting  shares  5/5 5/5 5/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 
Group 1  Frequency of voting (%)  100 100 100  80  80  80 
Voting  shares  10/11 10/12 10/13 11/14 11/15 11/16 
Group 2 
Frequency of voting (%)  91  83  77  79  73  69 
Sum  15 15 15 15 15 15 
Note: Voting shares are defined as the number of voting rights/number of governors. 
Source: ECB (2003, p. 78).  
The implication of the ECB proposal in terms of the distribution of the voting rights between 
the Executive Board on the one hand and the small, medium-sized and large euro-member 
countries on the other hand can be best analysed (though rarely performed up to now) using the 
game-theoretical concept of power indices, which is presented from a theoretical perspective in 
section 2 and applied empirically to the ECB decision-making process in section 3. In this 
sense, this study reaches beyond the early, more narrative discussions of the adjustment of 
voting modalities in the ECB Governing Council (see for example Belke, 2003 and Gros, 2003).  
2.  How to Apply the Power Index Concept 
The classical power indices that have their origin in solutions of cooperative games are often 
used to observe and quantify the allocation of power in a voting system. The distribution of 
power that is roughly defined as the influence of players on a voting outcome usually differs 
from the purely formal distribution of voting rights as has been shown in different studies 
(Owen, 1995, p. 460, Holler & Kellermann, 1978 and Leech, 2001a and 2001b). 
In this context, simple games are used to study the distribution of power in different voting 
situations. These types of games are usually defined as a conflict in which the only objective is 
winning and the only rule is an algorithm to decide which coalitions are winning. Weighted 
voting games that are frequently used in voting schemes represent an important subclass of 
these simple games. Two power indices, the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley, 1997) and the 
Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1965), have recently received the most attention in both theoretical 
literature and their application to political structures. Hence, we apply both indices to study the 
allocation of power in the Governing Council of the ECB in section 3. Nevertheless, both 
indices and the way to apply them to the problem of assessing voting power resulting from the 
rotation model is briefly explained below. 
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The concept of power indices has been frequently used to study the distribution of a priori 
voting power in different national and international voting systems. Dreyer & Schotter (1980) 
and Leech (2001a) published studies of power distribution in the IMF, while Owen (1995, p. 
460) analysed the United Nations Security Council. The voting power of European institutions 
has also been the subject of many studies. Bilbao et al. (2002), Sutter (2001) and Widgrén 
(1994) estimated the power of member states in the EU Council, while the European Parliament 
was subject to a power index application in Lane & Maeland (2000). Yet the distribution of 
power in the ECB Council has been the subject of only a few studies, probably because of the 
triviality of the analysis of the one member-one vote rule. Actually, the reform of this decision-
making body as proposed by the ECB results in a change of the equal distribution of the votes. 
Hence, the consideration of power distribution has become an important source of further 
insight on the impact of the reform of voting rights in the ECB Council. 
Throughout this report we present the results of calculations based on both of the classical 
power indices with the aim of checking the robustness of our results. But we base our 
conclusions mainly on the results derived from the Shapley index, closely following the 
approach of Widgrén (1994) in this respect. He has argued that the Shapley power index is more 
applicable to voting bodies in which there is considerable communication among the voters and 
coalition formation is active. This condition is surely met by the ECB Governing Council, 
owing to, for example the informal meetings on the eve of the official sessions and the collegial 
definition of the voting body.
1  
In the following calculations, the decision-making in the ECB Governing Council is thus 
assumed to be a weighted voting game. Each of the NCB governors as well as the Executive 
Board is considered as one player. Furthermore, the following three assumptions are crucial. 
First, it is assumed that all the present members of the Governing Council cooperate over 
several meetings. After the reform of the ECB Council, according to the rotation model, the 
members of the Council will not be allowed to vote at every session. Nevertheless, all of them 
will still be present at each session. Hence, it seems plausible that the members will form 
coalitions that persist during several meetings.  
                                                 
1 Nevertheless, it could be argued that the application of the Banzhaf index is more appropriate because of 
its interpretation as an I-power index. An I-power index concerns voting behaviour motivated by ‘policy-
seeking’, while a P-power index (e.g. the Shapley index) presupposes ‘office-seeking’ behaviour (see 
Fahrholz & Mohl, 2004, p. 6). We give the importance of the considerable communication a higher 
weight, but at the same time also refer to the Banzhaf index, which in almost all cases supports the results 
given by the Shapley index. 6 | BELKE & STYCZYNSKA 
 
In decision-making, it is not decisive if a vote is formally taken. Of much greater importance is 
the possibility of using a vote on an average of several meetings. This strategy leads to an active 
formation of inter-temporal coalitions during the preparations for decision-making. For this 
reason, the decision-making within the ECB Governing Council is considered as an inter-
temporally cooperative game in our approach.  
The second assumption refers to the preferences and the voting behaviour of the players. The 
NCB governors are regarded as representatives of their countries, thus voting with a national 
bias. This assumption refers to the classical analysis by Meade (2003a, 2003b, p. 131 and 
2003c, p. 2), who has shown that a national bias in the decision-making of the ECB Council 
cannot be excluded.
2 As long as the members of the Council are regarded as representatives of 
their countries because of their heritage, an incentive strengthened by the new rotation model, 
the suspicion persists that national aspects play an important role. 
Finally, the third assumption defines the role of the Executive Board. In the following 
calculations the Executive Board is considered as one player with six votes. The reason for this 
assumption is that we focus on the allocation of power among the national representatives. As 
the Executive Board is frequently assumed to represent the interests of the whole euro area, this 
unanimity assumption appears to be highly plausible. Yet there is no a priori restriction in 
coalition-forming among the national central bank presidents.  
The frequency of voting is interpreted as the inter-temporal weight. It enters the calculations as 
the voting weight of a player. Furthermore, a simple majority rule has been assumed for the 
calculations of the inter-temporal voting power, closely following the approach by Gruener 
(1998, p. 4). The numerous calculations have been made based on an algorithm originally 
developed by Bräuninger & König (2001), namely the Indices of Power IOP 2.0 programme. 
The figures presented in the following section are constructed in a consistent fashion: the x-axis 
displays the number of euro area member countries while the y-axis shows the relative voting 
right or the respective power index of the respective player (or both). 
3. Results 
3.1  Relative voting share and power in the reformed ECB Council 
The relative voting weights usually allow a first view of the allocation of power in the ECB 
Council. But these numbers also form the basis for the calculation of the more elaborated power 
indices. The numerical derivation of the voting shares and the resulting power indices can serve 
as the main ingredient of a detailed description of the characteristics of each of the voting rules 
compared in this study, i.e. the one person-one vote rule and the new rotation model. As a first 
step, the shifts of voting shares during an accession in a reformed ECB Council are investigated. 
As a second step, the results of the calculation of voting power for this case are discussed. In 
section 3.2, the results are compared with those derived for the status quo, the one person-one 
vote rule. Finally this comparison allows a comparative judgement about the usefulness and 
applicability of the new rotation model. 
Under the rotation model, the relative voting weights do not change proportionally with each 
enlargement of the euro area. The relative voting weight of the Executive Board is stabilised at 
6/21 and the voting weights of the national central bank presidents depend on the group to 
which the considered member of the European Central Bank Council can be counted, as can be 
seen in Figure 1. While the relative voting weight of a national central bank governor who is a 
                                                 
2 The assumption of nationally biased voting behaviour of national central bank presidents has also been 
applied in Bindseil (2001) and de Grauwe (2003, p. 21). THE ALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE ENLARGED ECB GOVERNING COUNCIL | 7 
 
member of the first group falls only once as the Union is enlarged to 19 members, the relative 
weight of the members of the other groups changes almost with every accession.  
As a result of the enlargement of the euro area, the relative voting weights of all groups fall as a 
trend, but for the members of group 2 a sudden rise in voting weight can be observed, i.e. when 
the 19
th and the 22
nd members accede. Figure 1 also clearly reveals the discrepancy between the 
relative voting weights of the members of different groups. The graph of group 1 is always 
located above the graphs for the other groups. Only once do the curves of groups 1 and 2 move 
closer to each other, whereas the relative voting share of group 3 is always visibly smaller.  
Figure 1. Voting shares of national central bank presidents under the rotation model 
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Rel. voting share
(rotation) member of
group 1
Rel. voting share
(rotation) member of
group 2
Rel. voting share
(rotation) member of
group 3
 
Source: Own calculations. 
What are the consequences of this allocation of voting rights on the distribution of power among 
the different members of the Governing Council? One important characteristic of this reform 
proposition is the division of the presidents of national central banks into two or three groups 
with different frequencies of voting. The other important implication of the rotation model is the 
stabilisation of the voting share of the Executive Board. The allocation of power that results in 
the wake of this reform under the assumption that the Council members cooperate over several 
meetings is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Power and voting shares of the Executive Board under the rotation model 
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Rel. voting share (rotation) Executive Board
Shapley index (rotation) Executive Board
Banzhaf index (rotation) Executive Board
 
Source: Own calculations. 8 | BELKE & STYCZYNSKA 
 
As revealed in Figure 2, the power index of the Executive Board is much less stable over time 
as could have been expected after examination of the relative voting shares. After the accession 
of the 17
th member country, a sudden reduction of both power indices can be observed. The 
accession of the 17
th country leads to an opposite reaction of power associated with the 
Executive Board, i.e. it rises. During the following accession both indices decrease. This trend is 
reversed after the accession of the 22
nd member state to the euro area. In the midst of subsequent 
euro-area enlargement rounds, the Banzhaf index rises whereas the Shapley index remains 
relatively stable throughout the enlargement process, which prompts the question of why such 
changes occur. 
In the first case, the power of the Executive Board decreases because the size of the Council 
rises without a reduction of the voting shares of group 1 members. But the accession of the 19
th 
member country (in the second case) leads to a cut in the voting share in group 1 from one to 
four-fifths. The influence of the Executive Board thus rises because the members of group 1 
cannot be as decisive for the coalitions as frequently as they could before. Yet the voting share 
of group 1 never shrinks below this mark of four-fifths. Hence, the power of the Executive 
Board drops until it is stabilised (in terms of the Shapley index) by the introduction of group 3 
(after the accession of the 22
nd member state), as a result of a reduction of the voting shares of 
group 2.  
Before we discuss the results of the calculation for each group, Table 3 shows the relation 
between the power indices of the Executive Board and each of the NCB governor groups 1 to 3. 
It becomes obvious that the power of the Executive Board exceeds the power of the national 
central bank presidents by a factor between 8 (in relation to group 1) and 24 (in relation to group 
3).
3  
Table 3. The relative power of the Executive Board under the rotation model 
Member countries of the 
  euro area: 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Shapley index Executive Bd. 
Shapley index group 1 
11.2 7.9 9.6 12.7 9.0 11.7 11.2 11.1 11.9 12.2 11.6 12.0
Shapley index Executive Bd. 
Shapley index group 2 
11.2 12.5 11.6 12.7 13.9 12.2 12.7 13.8 13.9 15.2 15.6 16.1
Shapley index Executive Bd. 
Shapley index group 3 
– – – – – –  19.2 19.5 21.4  19.9  23.6  24.3
Source: Own calculations. 
The development of the Shapley index of group 1, which is dependent on enlargement of the 
euro area, seems to be nearly opposite to that of the Executive Board, as can also be seen in 
Figure 3. The Shapley index rises suddenly as the 17
th member state accedes to the euro area. 
Hence, it can be assumed that the members of the first group win the power lost by the 
Executive Board at this stage of enlargement. As could have been expected, the power of the 
representative members of group 1 decreases sharply after the accession of the 19
th member 
state to the euro area, because at this point the voting rights are cut for the first time during the 
enlargement process. 
 
                                                 
3 If the Banzhaf index is considered instead, the differences are even larger. In this case, the Executive 
Board has 14 to 70 times more power at its disposal. THE ALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE ENLARGED ECB GOVERNING COUNCIL | 9 
 
It proves to be more difficult, however, to explain the surprising rise of the Shapley index after 
the accession of the 20
th euro-area member state. At this step of enlargement, power even 
exceeds the relative voting weight. As the votes of the Executive Board and the considered 
group do not change at this point, the shift in the distribution of power can only be explained 
through the decrease of the voting weights of the members of group 2. This shift in the 
allocation of voting rights changes the number of possibilities that are decisive in voting 
situations for group 1 members and raises their power in this specific scenario. After the next 
accession, the power of group 1 returns to the initial level again. The division of the NCB 
governors into three different groups does not affect the power of group 1 to a greater extent – it 
stays at a relatively stable level.  
Figure 3. Power and voting shares of a member of group 1 under the rotation model 
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3%
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5%
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Source: Own calculations. 
The development of the Banzhaf index reveals significant breaks at similar stages of the euro-
area enlargement process as the Shapley index does (Figure 3). But the calculated Banzhaf 
values are lower throughout. This result explains why the curve appears to be a parallel shift of 
the Shapley curve. Only after the accession of the 21
st member state do the curves seem to part 
from each other. While the Shapley value stays stable, the Banzhaf index decreases from this 
point onwards with each successive accession.  
When discussing the allocation of power to group 2 (Figure 4), changes observed up to the 
accession of the 22
nd member can be explained in a similar way. The only surprising change is 
the sudden rise in power after the accession of the 18
th country. Despite the decreasing voting 
share, the power as indicated by both indices rises. Hence, this stage of enlargement can be 
interpreted as a favourable constellation of voting shares that aids group 2. This reminds us of 
paradoxes such as ‘the paradox of redistribution’ or ‘the paradox of size’ typically discussed in 
the literature on power indices.
4 After the accession of the 22
nd country, the members of group 2 
lose power continuously – their Shapley index decreases from 0.042 for a euro area comprising 
20 member states to a realisation of 0.032 in the case of 27 members. 
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Figure 4. Power and voting shares of a member of group 2 under the rotation model 
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Source: Own calculations. 
For group 3 a negatively shaped curve can also be observed (Figure 5). It is noteworthy that this 
group 3 emerges from the accession of the 22
nd country. The members of this group have a 
lower share of the voting rights at their disposal than members of other groups and the power 
assigned to them is even lower than the voting share. During the enlargement process, their 
Shapley index decreases from 0.02 to 0.015 in the final scenario of the accession process. The 
power index of a representative member of group 2 exceeds the power of his or her counterpart 
in group 3 by two times in the final stage of a euro area consisting of 27 members.  
Figure 5. Power and voting shares of a member of group 3 under the rotation model 
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Source: Own calculations. 
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Have the observed voting shares thus been good indicators of the distribution of power within 
the reformed ECB Governing Council? The first hypothesis was that the power of the Executive 
Board would be stabilised by the reform. Our numerical application of the power index concept 
has shown that the position of this ‘sub-Council’ would not only be stabilised but also possibly 
strengthened. (This result is also confirmed by comparison to the power indices under the status 
quo rule.) The Shapley index of the Executive Board amounts to approximately 0.4 under all 
scenarios. This means that after the reform of the ECB decision-making process, 40% of the 
voting power devolves to the Executive Board.
5 
Our second hypothesis concerning the discrepancy between the power values of members of the 
different groups can be confirmed clearly. The five largest member states in the euro area in 
economic terms have between 19 and 24% of the voting power at their disposal. The medium-
sized group, which has 11 to 14 member states, can exercise between 30 and 40% of the voting 
power, while group 3 with six to eight members has about 11 to 13% of the available voting 
power. But the consideration of the allocation of power has also revealed a new and unexpected 
feature of the rotation model. Surprising shifts of power between the groups have been 
observed, especially in the sequential enlargement scenarios prior to the construction of the 
three groups.  
3.2  Comparison to the status quo: One person, one vote 
In the previous section, the voting shares and power indices for all members of the Governing 
Council were presented under the assumption of the rotation model already being in place. The 
following comparison to the status quo (one person, one vote), however, is helpful in order to 
assess the changes that are generated by the projected reform. For this purpose, the voting 
shares and power indices in the unreformed European Central Bank Governing Council are first 
briefly reported. To check the robustness of our results, both the Shapley and the Banzhaf 
indices are indicated in some figures.
6 Nevertheless, our discussion predominately refers to the 
Shapley index.  
For the unreformed Governing Council, under the one member-one vote rule each of the 
national central bank governors has one vote. Hence, their relative voting weight amounts to 
1/N, with N as the number of all members of the Governing Council. As previously discussed, 
the Executive Board is regarded as one player; consequently the voting weight of this specific 
player is 6/N. If a continuous enlargement of the Government Council is assumed, N increases 
and the relative voting shares of every player fall. Figure 6 shows the power indices for the 
Executive Board and additionally its relative voting weight. It becomes obvious that all the 
displayed curves reveal negative slopes. But both indices show a higher power index of the 
Executive Board than could have been expected after the examination of the allocation of 
relative voting weights.
7 The voting power that is attributed to the Executive Board by the 
Shapley index exceeds the relative voting rights to a smaller degree than the respective power 
expressed by the Banzhaf index. The voting power shown by the first index is between 20 and 
30% higher than the voting share, while the Banzhaf index reveals it to be between 45 and 60% 
higher. In both cases, the distance to the relative voting weights is reduced by each successive 
accession. 
                                                 
5 The numbers refer to the calculated Shapley values.  
6 The exact results are summarised in the Annex in Table A.3. 
7 The Shapley index is normally closer to the voting rights than the Banzhaf index, as discussed in Sutter 
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Figure 6. Power of the Executive Board under the one member-one vote rule 
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Number of member countries
V
o
t
i
n
g
 
s
h
a
r
e
/
p
o
w
e
r
 
i
n
d
e
x
Rel.voting share
(status quo)
Executive Board
Shapley index
(status quo)
Executive Board
Banzhaf index
(status quo)
Executive Board
 
  Source: Own calculations. 
But what impact does this allocation of voting rights have on the distribution of power among 
the NCB governors? The presentation of the voting power and voting weights of the national 
central bank presidents in Figure 7 is very similar to Figure 6 at first glance, but a closer 
inspection immediately reveals that the curves have a different order. The NCB governors have 
less influence on the voting result than expected if relative voting weights are examined. 
Contrary to the results for the Executive Board, the Shapley indices now exceed the Banzhaf 
values.
8  
Figure 7. Power of national central bank presidents under the one member-one vote rule 
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Source: Own calculations. 
This result, however, does not come as a surprise because a number of empirical applications 
confirm that the voting power of the ‘largest’ player often tends to be higher than his or her 
                                                 
8 The explanation is that the indices can always be summed to 1 and the Banzhaf indices were higher for 
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voting share. The opposite is true for the ‘smallest’ player, as discussed in Widgrén (1994, p. 
1154). Here the Executive Board with six votes is the ‘largest player’ and its power is several 
times higher than the corresponding power values of an individual NCB governor. Under the 
status quo rule, the voting weights of the Executive Board are always six times higher than the 
voting share of a single NCB governor, while the difference between the respective power 
indices is even more considerable.  
Figures 8 to 11 present a comparison of power indices resulting for each considered group of the 
ECB Council. In Figure 8, the realisations of the power indices of the Executive Board under 
the rotation model are compared with those under the status quo ante. It is clearly visible that 
the rotation model not only stabilises the power of the Executive Board, it even gains power 
after the reform proposed by the ECB: its Shapley index nearly doubles in the long term.  
Figure 8. Power of the Executive Board (status quo and rotation) 
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 Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 9. Power of a representative member of group 1 (status quo and rotation) 
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But not only the Executive Board benefits from the adaptation of the rotation model – the 
members of group 1 are vested with more voting power in the reformed Council in nearly all the 
accession phases as compared with their power in an unreformed Council (Figure 9). Hence, 
there are also groups who lose their ability to influence the voting outcome. In this case, the 
losers under the reform are groups 2 and 3, as demonstrated in Figures 10 and 11. Thus, the 
NCB governors of group 2 have to give up less power than the members of group 3. While 
group 2 members lose 10 to 20% of their initial power, the power indices of the NCB governors 
from the economically less important member states are between 38 and 45% lower than under 
the one member-one vote rule. 
Figure 10. Power of a representative member of group 2 (status quo and rotation) 
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Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 11. Power of a representative member of group 3 (status quo and rotation) 
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Source: Own calculations. 
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Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11 also show very clearly that in the reformed Council the enlargement of 
the monetary union leads to unexpected shifts in the power of groups, as already discussed in 
the previous section. Here it is apparent that this development cannot be observed in the case of 
an unreformed Council. According to the preceding analysis, the rotation model cannot be 
considered as a robust voting rule, as the accession of new euro-area member states can lead to 
unexpected and probably unintended shifts in the allocation of power. One important 
implication for monetary policy-making is that these unexpected changes make it difficult for 
the public to form accurate inflation expectations as long as the accession process is incomplete. 
The prediction of the actual possibilities for forming a majority in a Council vote changes in a 
way that cannot be extrapolated from a mere visual inspection of the voting shares.  
Thus seen on the whole, both positive and negative characteristics of the rotation model have 
been identified in the wake of our systematic comparison with the status quo. The strengthening 
of the Executive Board can be considered as a benefit. Its influence on the voting outcome is 
much more important within the reformed Governing Council. Hence, the representatives of the 
European perspective versus those with a national bias have a stronger standing in the reformed 
Council when compared with the status quo. 
Nevertheless, the lack of robustness must be seen as a disadvantage of the rotation model. Given 
the new voting shares, it is impossible to predict how the relations of power will really change. 
This voting system cannot be judged as transparent, because intuition does not enable one to 
come to similar conclusions as those arrived at through the relatively complex calculation of 
power indices. Moreover, the fact that after reform of the Council the members of group 3 are 
the only members that lose considerable voting power confirms the suspicion that the present 
Governing Council wanted to protect its voting influence at the expense of the accession 
countries. 
3.3  An assessment of the representativeness principle 
In designing the precise features of the rotation system, the Governing Council was guided by 
some fundamental principles such as one member, one vote, ad personam participation, 
representativeness, automaticity and transparency.
9 In the following discussion, we only focus 
on the important principle of representativeness. Its justification by the ECB runs as follows.  
The introduction of a rotation of voting rights could lead to situations in which the group of 
governors with a voting right are from member states that, taken together, may be perceived as 
not being sufficiently representative of the euro area economy as a whole. The new voting 
system, therefore, should be designed in a manner that would safeguard against such outcomes.  
In order to achieve representativeness, governors might not be able to exercise their voting 
rights with the same frequency, with governors from the larger member states having the right 
to vote more frequently than those from smaller member states. At the same time, any reference 
to the country from which a governor comes should be made exclusively for the purpose of 
determining the frequency with which each governor exercises his or her voting right. Although 
the introduction of considerations of representativeness marks a departure from the existing 
provisions for voting in the Governing Council, this is solely motivated by the need to 
accommodate the impact of enlargement on the ECB’s decision-making. For all governors 
exercising the voting right at any point in time, the one member-one vote principle should 
apply. Consequently, this differentiation should not affect actual substantive decision-making 
but should only be relevant in the process of determining who votes when.  
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In this section, one important aspect of this guiding principle of representativeness is examined. 
According to this definition, an ECB Council voting system meets this criterion if it minimises 
the discrepancy between the voting share and the respective economic weight of each of the 
member countries. As a modification of this definition, the discrepancy between the voting 
power and the economic weight and its development in the wake of the eurozone enlargement 
process is examined. More concretely, we analyse whether this difference is diminished through 
the implicit abandonment of the one member-one vote principle and its substitution by the 
rotation model. For this purpose, two figures are compared and presented in Figure 12.  
Figure 12. The principle of representativeness – Power and GDP shares for the euro area-27 
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The first number expresses the relative voting power of a single NCB governor for each 
accession phase as presented in Amend (2003). The relative power is calculated as the voting 
power of an NCB governor divided by the power of all NCB governors, both expressed through 
the Shapley value.
10 As the second number, the GDP ratio of the respective country in the euro 
area GDP has been chosen as an approximation of the relative economic weight.
11 Both figures 
are compared in Figure 12 for each country in the case of a hypothetical euro area consisting of 
27 member countries. The order of the countries is chosen to correspond with the ranking that 
results from the indicators proposed by the ECB.  
A first inspection of Figure 12 allows the non-rejection of the hypothesis that the introduction of 
the rotation model (grey bars) leads to an improvement of representativeness because under the 
status quo rule (white bars) the difference between the economic weights and the political 
weights of member states is larger. Nevertheless, the differences between the power and GDP 
ratios of member countries are still large after the reform, especially so for the members of 
group 1.  
Considering the sum of squared deviations enables a more exact comparison of the degrees of 
representativeness under the status quo rule and under the rotation model (Gros, 2003, p. 125). 
The sum results from the differences between the GDP weight and the relative power as 
measured for each member country. Table 4 shows the sums of squared deviations in four 
different scenarios of possible accession phases.  
Table 4. Differences between the GDP-weight and the relative voting power – Squared 
deviations 
  Squared deviation 
status quo  Squared deviation rotation 
Euro area-17  0.12  0.09 
Euro area-22  0.12  0.10 
Euro area-24  0.12  0.10 
Euro area-27  0.09  0.07 
Source: Own calculations. 
In each scenario, this sum proves to be smaller under the rotation model than under the status 
quo rule. The sum of the squares under the status quo in the case of a euro area consisting of 27 
countries is 0.09. As already supposed after the examination of Figure 12, this sum is smaller 
under the rotation model at 0.07. Consequently, we feel justified to conclude that the rotation 
model leads to an improvement compared with the status quo concerning the criterion of 
representativeness. Nevertheless, even after the reform large differences between the shares in 
voting power and in GDP can be found. This result is comparable to the results discussed in the 
literature (e.g. Bofinger, 2003 and Gros, 2003) where only a slight improvement concerning this 
criterion is ascertained. 
4.  Conclusions and Potential for Further Research 
Our analysis of the inter-temporal power indices in the context of the ECB Governing Council 
has revealed and highlighted some interesting aspects of both the reformed and unreformed 
voting system. One negative feature of the proposed voting reform is the sharp shift of the 
allocation of power during the early euro-area accession phases. This shift could have negative 
                                                 
10 See also Table A.2; with this definition, we closely follow Berger (2002, p. 12) and Gros (2003, p. 
125). 
11 Table A.1 summarises the GDP data for EU member states and candidate countries.  18 | BELKE & STYCZYNSKA 
 
effects on the transparency of ECB decision-making and may result in a bias of inflation 
expectations. The second aspect of the rotation model that comes at a cost is the fact that the 
reform leads to a voting system where especially the acceding countries lose influence on the 
voting result compared with their voting power under the status quo. This could lead to a re-
nationalisation of monetary policy in the euro area.  
One benefit associated with the reform, however, is the higher degree of representativeness it 
would entail. But this effect is numerically very small and thus should not be overvalued. A 
further more important result is that the voting power of the Executive Board would be 
considerably strengthened through the reform. Under the quite realistic presumption that the 
Executive Board represents the interests of the euro area, this result tends to come as a benefit. 
In this case, the rotation model could have a stabilising effect on inflation expectations, which 
would alleviate the negative impact of the sudden shifts of power allocation. Moreover, 
European versus national aggregates could be more easily accepted by the public as an anchor 
for setting inflation expectations. 
Yet this is not the first study of the new rotation model based on power indices. We are aware of 
one other study in the field, namely the recent study by Fahrholz & Mohl (2004). Despite the 
methodology that is common to both studies, Fahrholz & Mohl arrive at different conclusions. 
They find that the power of the Executive Board diminishes as a result of the introduction of the 
rotation model, whereas in our study the opposite appears to occur. The assumptions underlying 
each of the two approaches may be one explanation for this difference. These assumptions build 
the core basis for the calculations of power indices and hence have a decisive effect on the 
results.  
In our study, each national central bank governor is assumed to be a separate player and to 
follow a national perspective while the Executive Board is modelled as one player owing to the 
assumed common orientation towards European aggregates. By contrast, the analysis by 
Fahrholz & Mohl not only models the Executive Board but also each of the groups of national 
central bank presidents, which emerge after the reform as one player. In our view, however, 
there are some significant counter-arguments against the view that the NCB presidents will vote 
in a common fashion simply because they are part of a group (Belke, 2003 and Meade, 2003a, 
2003b and 2003c). For instance, for two large countries that clearly belong to group 1 under the 
scenario of a euro area-27, namely Germany and the UK (with its cycle connected more closely 
to the US cycle than that of the euro area), the business cycle pattern may not be exactly 
synchronous. 
Further, there are other potential caveats with respect to the assumption of homogeneity among 
group members. First, the rotation procedure violates the central principle of one person, one 
vote, as the latter will only apply to those national central bank governors who are allowed to 
vote. The principle is put at risk in two ways: 1) the countries are weighted and 2) the rotation 
takes place with a different frequency for each group. Thus, the reform proposal does not meet 
the ratio of an integrative monetary policy. The renunciation of this tenet at best foments 
thinking in national terms. In other words, it re-nationalises European monetary policy.  
Second, the principle of personal and independent participation in the Governing Council, the 
so-called ‘ad personam participation’, is impeded by the rotation model. Safeguarding this 
principle, which was eminently successful in case of the German Landeszentralbanken, was the 
main motivation and legitimisation of the principle of one person, one vote. In this bloated, 
reformed ECB Governing Council, each national central bank governor will experience that it is 
mainly his or her national provenance that will play a role in monetary decision-making and not 
his or her personality as a monetary policy expert. This experience will most probably induce 
each governor to make decisions from a more national perspective. Such an incentive will 
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within the European Central Bank. Therefore, a rational monetary policy according to the 
stability goal becomes vastly complicated. Nevertheless, the different approaches taken by this 
study and the analyses of Fahrholz & Mohl offer a very fruitful field for further research. 
It is also conceivable to extend the approach taken in this study to certain aspects of decision-
making in the Governing Council, such as the modalities of decision-making. For instance, it is 
well known that both the tradition of deciding in a consensual fashion and the agenda-setting 
power of the Executive Board are the main ingredients of the meetings of the ECB Council. 
Von Hagen (2003, p. 108) has taken these aspects into account in his analysis of the Governing 
Council prior to the reform. He essentially applies the median voter model to investigate what 
impact the traditional terms of decision-making have on the results of monetary policy. New 
insights could be gained if the rotation model is analysed along these lines.  
As a further possibility of extending our analysis, the monetary policy preferences of national 
central bank presidents could be included. The inclusion of such preferences in the analysis 
would make it possible to identify likely coalitions among Governing Council members who 
represent similar interests. The probability models used in the studies that model the Governing 
Council could be modified in accordance with information about the probabilities of certain 
coalitions forming. This could be achieved by defining the subsystems within which coalitions 
are joined with a higher probability. This approach was first used in Owen (1977) and has been 
applied to the EU Council in Widgrén (1994, p. 1154). In a similar fashion, this approach could 
be used to register the subsystems inside the Governing Council, wherein the Executive Board 
could be defined as one subsystem. Analogously, those groups of national central bank 
presidents whose home countries traditionally have similar business cycles could also be 
modelled as subsystems.  
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Annex 
Table A.1 GDP of EU member and candidate countries (€ millions) 
Country GDP  
Germany 2,108,200.00
Great Britain  1,659,111.90
France 1,520,804.00
Italy 1,258,349.00
Spain 693,925.00
The Netherlands  444,033.00
Belgium 260,744.00
Sweden 255,423.10
Austria 216,830.50
Denmark 182,799.80
Ireland 128,187.40
Poland 200,198.00
Portugal 129,187.60
Greece 141,132.00
Luxembourg 22,340.50
Finland 139,734.00
Czech Republic  73,874.80
Hungary 69,888.90
Romania 48,361.80
Slovakia 25,147.00
Slovenia 23,385.10
Bulgaria 16,583.00
Lithuania 14,649.40
Cyprus 10,762.20
Latvia 8,940.20
Estonia 6,904.00
Malta 4,096.60
Source: Eurostat (2003a and 2003b). 
 
Table A.2 Representative national central bank presidents’ shares of the sum of Shapley 
values of all national central bank presidents 
    16  17  18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
Group 1  0.063  0.079 0.0638  0.0526 0.0678 0.0489 0.0552 0.0554 0.0522 0.0506 0.0536 0.0517
Group 2  0.063  0.05 0.0524  0.0526 0.0441 0.0472 0.0483 0.0445 0.0447 0.0408 0.0401 0.0384
Group 2  –  –  –  –  –  –  0.0321 0.0315 0.029 0.031  0.0264  0.0255
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table A.3 Derivation of voting weights and power indices (rotation and status quo) 
    16  17 18 19 20 21 22  23  24  25  26 27 
Rel. voting share (status 
quo) Executive Board  0.2727 0.2609  0.2500 0.2400 0.2308 0.2593 0.2143 0.2069 0.2000 0.1935 0.1875 0.1818
Shapley index (status quo) 
Executive Board  0.3529 0.3333  0.3158 0.3000 0.2857 0.2727 0.2609 0.2500 0.2400 0.2308 0.2222 0.2143
Banzhaf index (status quo) 
Executive Board  0.4454 0.4305  0.3952 0.3824 0.3541 0.3431 0.3202 0.3106 0.2918 0.2834 0.2677 0.2603
Rel. voting share (rotation) 
Executive Board  0.2857 0.2857  0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857
Shapley index (rotation) 
Executive Board  0.4118 0.3858  0.3788 0.4000 0.3794 0.3647 0.3810 0.3800 0.3832 0.3820 0.3842 0.3826
Banzhaf index (rotation) 
Executive Board  0.5807 0.5232  0.5328 0.6013 0.5513 0.5447 0.5834 0.5939 0.6138 0.6291 0.6376 0.6472
Shapley index (status quo) 
nat. central bank president  0.0404 0.0392  0.0380 0.0368 0.0357 0.0346 0.0336 0.0326 0.0317 0.0308 0.0299 0.0291
Banzhaf index (status quo) 
nat. central bank presidents  0.0347 0.0335  0.0336 0.0325 0.0323 0.0313 0.0309 0.0300 0.0295 0.0287 0.0282 0.0274
Rel. voting share (status 
quo) nat. central bank 
presidents 
0.0455 0.0435  0.0417 0.0400 0.0385 0.0370 0.0357 0.0345 0.0333 0.0323 0.0313 0.0303
Frequency of voting group 1 5/5  5/5  5/5  4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5  4/5 
Rel. voting share (rotation) 
group 1  0.0476 0.0476  0.0476 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381
Shapley index (rotation) 
group 1  0.0368 0.0487  0.0396 0.0316 0.0421 0.0310 0.0342 0.0344 0.0322 0.0312 0.0330 0.0319
Banzhaf index (rotation) 
group 1  0.0262 0.0363  0.0285 0.0210 0.0293 0.0220 0.0228 0.0220 0.0196 0.0184 0.0188 0.0176
Frequency of voting group 2 10/11  10/12  10/13  11/14 11/15 11/16  8/11  8/12 8/12 8/13 8/13  8/14 
Rel. voting share (rotation) 
group 2  0.0433 0.0397  0.0366 0.0374 0.0349 0.0327 0.0346 0.0317 0.0317 0.0293 0.0293 0.0272
Shapley index (rotation) 
group 2  0.0368 0.0309  0.0325 0.0316 0.0273 0.0300 0.0299 0.0276 0.0275 0.0252 0.0247 0.0237
Banzhaf index (rotation) 
group 2  0.0262 0.0246  0.0250 0.0210 0.0201 0.0216 0.0201 0.0181 0.0171 0.0152 0.0146 0.0136
Frequency of voting group 3 –  –  –  –  –  –  3/6 3/6 3/7 3/7 3/8  3/8 
Rel. voting share (rotation) 
group 3  –  – – – – –  0.0238 0.0238  0.0204  0.0204  0.0179 0.0179
Shapley index (rotation) 
group 3  –  – – – – –  0.0199 0.0195  0.0179  0.0192  0.0163 0.0157
Banzhaf index (rotation) 
group 3  –  – – – – –  0.0136 0.0132  0.0118  0.0116  0.0098 0.0093
Source: Own calculations based on the Indices of Power IOP 2.0 algorithm by Bräuninger & König (2001).  
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